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EVIDENCE—PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL—OBJECTION TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE IS WAIVED WHEN A 
DEFENDANT TESTIFIES TO SUCH EVIDENCE ON DIRECT EXAMINATION—
Ohler v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1851 (2000). 
In 1997, a customs inspector stopped the appellant, Maria Ohler, 
while she was driving a vehicle from Mexico to California.  Ohler v. 
United States, 120 S. Ct. 1851, 1852 (2000).  The inspector observed that 
someone had altered one of the vehicle’s interior panels.  After a search of 
the vehicle, customs inspectors seized close to 81 pounds of marijuana.  
The inspectors arrested Ohler, and she was later charged with importation 
of marijuana, as well as possession with the intent to distribute. 
In 1993, prior to these events, Ohler had been found guilty of 
possessing methamphetamine.  Before trial, the Government filed in limine 
motions with the district court seeking the admission of Ohler’s prior 
felony conviction as character evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) and for impeachment purposes pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1).  
The district court denied the use of the conviction for character purposes 
under 404(b), but at trial allowed the Government to use Ohler’s prior 
conviction for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1).  Testifying at 
trial, Ohler admitted to the 1993 conviction of possession of 
methamphetamine conviction during direct examination.  The jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced Ohler to 
thirty months incarceration. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s in limine ruling allowing the use of the prior conviction for 
impeachment purposes.  Id. at 1853.  The court of appeals held that Ohler 
had waived her objection to the district court’s ruling because she testified 
to her prior conviction during her direct examination.  Id.  (citing Ohler v. 
United States, 169 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, 
holding that a criminal defendant waives her right to appeal the admission 
of prior conviction evidence if she testifies to such evidence during direct 
examination.  Id. at 1853, 1855.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 
five-member majority, began the opinion by reviewing the general rule that 
a party who introduces evidence at trial cannot thereafter complain to a 
reviewing court of its erroneous admission.  Id. at 1853.  The Chief Justice 
found neither Rule 103 nor Rule 609 to be inconsistent with this general 
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principle.  Id.  Rather, the majority observed that Rule 103 merely governs 
the timeliness and substance of an objection and does not deal with the 
waiver of a prior objection, the admission of evidence during direct 
examination, or the later appeal of such an admission.  Id. 
Continuing, the Court also found that Rule 609(a) merely permits the 
use of a witness’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes, on either 
direct or cross examination, upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.  Id.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, recognizing that Rule 609(a) allows the admission 
of impeachment evidence during direct examination, rejected the notion 
that the rule allows a defendant to testify to prior convictions on direct 
examination while simultaneously maintaining an objection to the 
admissibility of such evidence.  Id. 
The Court next addressed Ohler’s contention that a defendant may 
admit prior conviction evidence during direct examination in order to 
lessen the impact of such evidence on the jury and that a waiver rule would 
force the loss of that tactical advantage.  Id.  The majority found that such a 
contention obscures the real issue: Both the Government and the defendant 
must make tactical choices throughout the course of a trial.  Id. at 1854.  
The Chief Justice observed that a defendant must first decide whether or 
not to testify in his or her own defense and risk possible impeachment by 
prior convictions during cross-examination.  Id.  The Court remarked that 
the defendant then must choose whether or not to introduce prior 
conviction evidence during direct examination in the hope of appearing 
more credible to a jury.  Id. 
The majority recognized that the Government also has choices to 
make if the defendant elects to testify.  Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
observed that the Government must decide whether or not to impeach a 
defendant using prior conviction evidence after weighing the effectiveness 
of the prior conviction evidence against the potential risk of reversal on 
appeal if the trial court erroneously admits the evidence.  Id.  The Court 
propounded that, though the Government undoubtedly has an advantage 
over the defendant in that cross-examination follows direct examination, a 
defendant cannot eliminate this decision-making process and still preserve 
the admission of a prior conviction as an issue for appeal.  Id.  The 
majority, relying on the similar case of Luce v. United States, found that a 
defendant suffers no harm per se from a district court’s in limine ruling.  Id. 
at 1854.  (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984)).  The Court 
declared that it is not unfair to require a defendant to make the choice 
between providing direct testimony of a prior conviction, thereby waiving 
right to appeal, or remaining silent about prior convictions and preserving 
the issue for appeal if the Government does raise the issue on cross 
examination.  Id. at 1855. 
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Finally, the Court rejected the proposition that a waiver rule 
unconstitutionally burdens a defendant’s right to testify.  Id. at 1855.  The 
majority contended that a waiver rule does not prevent a defendant from 
testifying to any admissible evidence she so chooses to reveal.  Id.  The 
Chief Justice maintained that the threat of cross-examination—specifically 
impeachment by prior convictions—is not an unconstitutional burden on a 
defendant’s right to testify.  Id. (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183 (1971)).  The Court held that Ohler’s introduction of her prior 
conviction during her direct examination constituted a waiver to the in 
limine ruling admitting such evidence and thus could not be appealed.  Id. 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
dissented.  Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued that the 
majority’s opinion lacked support in both the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and precedent.  Id.  Justice Souter questioned the Court’s reliance on Luce 
v. United States for the derivation of a waiver rule.  Id. at 1855 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)).  The dissent 
maintained that Luce stands for the proposition that a defendant faced with 
an in limine ruling admitting prior conviction evidence for impeachment 
purposes must actually testify in order to argue against the admission of 
such evidence on appeal.  Id.  As such, Justice Souter asserted that Luce 
merely recognized an appellate court’s inability to assess an in limine 
ruling if the defendant fails to testify and did not establish a waiver of the 
right to appeal the ruling.  Id. at 1855-56 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
The dissent distinguished Luce from the present case, observing that 
the district court’s in limine ruling controlled Ohler’s decision to testify to 
her prior conviction, and that a factual record of the testimony was 
preserved for appellate review.  Id. at 1856 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Souter proclaimed that the in limine ruling certainly controlled Ohler’s 
attorney’s decision to testify about the conviction, observing that 
counselors do not set out to impeach their own clients.  Id.  Consequently, 
the dissent argued that Luce does not control the case at bar because a 
reviewing court could pinpoint the harm to the defendant and perform a 
harmless error analysis.  Id. 
The dissent next rejected the majority’s reliance on the general rule 
that a party who introduces evidence at trial cannot thereafter complain to 
an appellate court of its erroneous admission, contending that it was not 
based upon precedent, but rather a “commonsense” rule.  Id.  Justice 
Souter, recognizing the common sense notions behind such a rule in certain 
situations, argued that the same common sense dictates the opposite result 
in the instant case.  Id.  The dissent propounded that, when a defendant 
opposes the admission of the evidence and subsequently introduces the 
evidence to mitigate its effect on the jury, the case falls outside the scope of 
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this general rule.  Id.  Justice Souter argued that the law of evidence fails to 
support the majority’s position, and, in fact, points to the opposite 
conclusion.  Id. at 1857 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Continuing, the dissent addressed the majority’s contention that it is 
not unfair to force the defendant to choose between testifying to prior 
conviction evidence or remaining silent to preserve the appeal.  Id.  Justice 
Souter asserted that the goal of the rules of evidence and the role of the 
court is the discovery of the truth, and not the preservation of tactical 
advantages at trial.  Id.  The dissent argued that the majority’s approach 
does not meet this goal.  Id.  The Justice asserted that the purpose of Rule 
609 is to provide the jury with information for judging the veracity of the 
defendant’s testimony.  Id.  The dissent stressed that such a purpose is 
served even if the defendant testifies to prior convictions.  Id. 
Finally, Justice Souter observed that the introduction of prior 
conviction evidence during cross-examination might in fact cause the jury 
to believe the defendant was intentionally trying to conceal the evidence.  
Id.  Justice Souter remarked that such a situation is antithetical to the 
purpose behind Rule 609 in that the jury’s role in seeking the truth is 
potentially compromised by their human emotions.  Id.  The Justice 
concluded by finding no reason to dissuade the defendant from admitting 
prior conviction evidence during her direct examination by foreclosing an 
opportunity to appeal the admission.  Id. at 1857-58 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
While the purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) is to provide 
the jury with evidence to be used solely for judging the credibility of the 
defendant, practical considerations dictate that the evidence might be used 
for purposes other than impeachment.  As a result, the defendant is likely to 
testify to the prior conviction evidence during direct examination in an 
attempt to lessen its impact on the jury, preferring an acquittal rather than 
the preservation of an issue for appeal.  If the trial court erroneously 
admitted the prior conviction evidence, then the defendant was tactically 
forced to introduce inadmissible evidence and now has no recourse if the 
jury finds her guilty.  Thus, after the Court’s decision in Ohler, defendants 
must now reevaluate whether the tactical advantage of introducing prior 
conviction evidence on direct outweighs the potential harm in waiving the 
right to appeal the court’s in limine ruling allowing such evidence. 
 
Robert M. Brush 
 
 
